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Abstract: This examination provides a history of the problematic character-
isation of Early German Romanticism (or Frühromantik) as subjectivist, and
challenges this characterisation in light of recent scholarship. From its earliest
critical reception in the early nineteenth century, the movement suffered from
a set of problematic characterisations made by popular philosophical figures.
Goethe, Hegel, Heine, Kierkegaard and others all criticised the movement for
holding a dangerous subjective egoism. This characterisation remained with
the Frühromantik throughout the twentieth century until it was challenged by
recent re-evaluations offered by figures such as Dieter Henrich, Manfred Frank,
Friedrich Beiser and Andrew Bowie. Their work has opened new possibilities for
the re-interpretation of Frühromantik and our understanding of the movement’s
religious thought.
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Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.
Goethe, Faust I
To address the question of religion in Early German Romanticism, it is essential
that certain assumptions that have been at play since the movement’s inception
are called into question. Foremost among these is the ‘subjectivity‘ of Frühro-
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mantik, which arises in the wake of Kant’s Copernican revolution. This char-
acterisation, to borrow from Faust, has cloaked the green life of the Romantic
movement in grey theory, obscuring its golden tree. From Kantian idealism to
post-structuralism, the reception history of modern philosophy has been over-
whelmingly concerned with the question of how the mind structures experience.1
In the case of Frühromantik this has specifically taken the form of the move-
ment’s characterisation as a form of ironic aesthetic subjectivism grounded in a
Fichtian absolute ego. Recent scholarship has, however, shown the opposite to
be the case. Rather than arguing from a Fichtian position, Early German Roman-
ticism instead sought to develop an alternative to the threat of pure subjectivity.2
Instead, we can increasingly see the Frühromantik as fundamentally concerned
with the question of absolute Being, and the problem of its representation. The
movement’s development of an aesthetic mode of expression aims to illustrate
that the Absolute, though conceptually inarticulable, was not beyond intelli-
gibility. In this regard, Early German Romanticism’s concern with aesthetics
is not an illustration of the power of the absolute ego, but an expression and
acknowledgement of the contingent nature of the finite ego’s utterances vis-à-vis
absolute Being.
The end of this examination is foremost to provide a history of the charac-
terisation of Early German Romanticism as subjectivist, and to offer an outline
of how recent scholarship has challenged this. Such a history will help us to
understand why the religious thought of Early German Romanticism has been
overlooked for so long, and hopefully spur us to take further account of it. We
see that from its earliest critical reception in the nineteenth century, the move-
ment has suffered from a problematic reading that does little justice to its true
end. Until very recently the accusation against Early German Romanticism of
holding a dangerous subjective egoism continued throughout the twentieth cen-
tury. Yet even with this development the recent re-evaluation of Frühromantik,
whilst rejecting the characterisation of the movement as subjective, has itself
1 Robert B. Pippin, The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005; Quentin Meillassoux, Après la finitude: Essai sur la nécessité de la
contingence. Paris: Seuil, 2006; Lee Braver, A Thing of this World: A History of Continental Anti-
Realism. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007; Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, Graham
Harman, “Towards a Speculative Philosophy.” In The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism
and Realism, ed. Levi Bryant et al. Melbourne: Re.press, 2011, 1–18.
2 Whether Fichte’s philosophywas foundationalist or not, or whether it evolved from the former to
the latter in its character is beyond the scope of this examiniation. For differing opinions see Terry
Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge
University Press, 2002, 116, n. 18; and Daniel Breazeale, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre,
ed. and trans. by Daniel Breazeale. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994, viii.
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been dominated by the accusation. Accordingly, the movement’s true end of
finding a unity between realism and idealism, between the subjective and the
objective, and in so doing develop a new language for absolute Being, remains
to be fully explicated and appreciated. It is here where the movement’s religious
dimension emerges, as it takes on the fundamentally religious task of developing
a finite idiom for absolute Being.
1 Which Romanticism?
Before we begin to look at the reception of Early German Romanticism, it is
necessary to define the movement itself. Not unlike any other movement, but
perhaps to a greater degree, Romanticism has a certain notoriety when it comes
to its definition. Early in the twentieth century, the intellectual historian A. O.
Lovejoy suggested it was impossible to define the wider movement, and began
to write of ‘Romanticisms’ instead.3 In response, Isaiah Berlin objected to this
abandonment, but equally conceded that the task of defining Romanticism ‘is
like that dark cave described by Virgil, where all footsteps lead in one direction
[. . .] those who enter it seem never to emerge again’.4 Despite, or perhaps
because of these problems, Early German Romanticism offers an ideal starting
place, as it is the original self-described Romantic movement.5 It was from its
inception in Mitteleuropa that Romantic movements at all points of the compass,
in Europe and beyond, would develop.
German Romanticism has traditionally been divided into three periods:
Frühromantik, Hochromantik and Spätromantik. Though not unproblematic, this
division remains useful, as each period has differing fundamental concerns, and
often different actors. The Frühromantik is characterised by the community that
formed around the brothers Friedrich and August Schlegel, Friedrich Schleier-
macher, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), Ludwig Tieck and Wilhelm Heinrich
Wackenroder. In addition to these figures Friedrich Hölderlin, and Friedrich
Schelling are also often numbered among the Romantics. More recently this list
has grown to include Dorothea Veit Schlegel, and Caroline Schlegel Schelling.
The group is defined by its own particular response to a set of philosophical and
theological problems arising from reactions to both the Pantheism Controversy,
3 Arthur O. Lovejoy, “On the Discrimination of Romanticisms.” PMLA 39 (1924): 229–253.
4 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism. The A.W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, 1965, The
National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC, ed. Henry Hardy. London: Pimlico, 2000, 1.
5 Cf. Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. Ernst Behler and others.
Munich: Schöningh, 1958–2002, vol. II, 183.
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as found in the work of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Johann Gottfied Herder and
Karl Philipp Moritz, and to the Critical philosophy, as developed by Johann
Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Leonhard Reinhold and Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer,
as well as the social and national concerns that grew out of the Revolutionary
period. With Early German Romanticism defined, it is now possible to take up
the history of its reception.
2 The nineteenth century accusation and its legacy
Early German Romanticism has long been perceived in a negative light, char-
acterised as sickly and naïve, relativistic and destructive. These characteristics
arose from what was perceived as the subjective indulgence and egoism of
Frühromantik aesthetics. This portrayal has its origin with a number of influen-
tial figures, including Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Heinrich Heine, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel and Søren Kierkegaard. Their critical portrayal of the movement
has perpetuated a series of misreadings, clichés and distorted caricatures that
have continued to this day. While some of their comments may be excused in
the context of polemics or rhetorical playfulness, due to the cultural influence
of these authors, the afterlife of their characterisations has been long. Perhaps
one of the best examples is Goethe’s famous remark: ‘I call the classical the
healthy, and the Romantic the sick’, further characterising the former as ‘strong,
sanguine, happy and healthy’, and the latter as ‘weak, sickly and ill’.6
One of the most popular treatments of the Romantics may be found in
Heinrich Heine’s influential Die romantische Schule (1835), which criticised the
positive portrayal found in Madame de Staël’s De l’Allemagne (1813). Heine,
echoing Goethe’s anti-Romantic rhetoric, accused the movement of reactionary
conservatism and esotericism. To exemplify this he pointed to the Schlegel
brothers, Friedrich turning to Roman Catholicism and August to orientalism:
‘Friedrich Schlegel went to Vienna where he daily attended Mass and ate roast
chicken. Mr. August Wilhelm Schlegel retired into the pagoda of Brahma.’7 Heine
described the writing of the Romantics as ‘colossal products of madness’.8 Of the
6 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens (Münchner
Ausgabe), ed. Karl Richter, vol. 19. Munich: Carl Hanser, 1986, 300. Cf. Arnd Bohn, “Goethe and
the Romantics.” In The Literature of German Romanticism, ed. Dennis F. Mahoney. Rochester, NY:
Camden House, 2004, 35–60.
7 Heinrich Heine, On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany and Other Writings, ed.
Terry Pinkard, trans. by Howard Pollack-Milgate. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press,
2007, 152.
8 Ibid., 141.
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work of Hoffman and Novalis he wrote that ‘their poetry was actually a disease
[. . .] the rosy shine in the literary works of Novalis is not the colour of health,
but of consumption; the purple glow in Hoffmann’s Fantasy Pieces is not the
flame of genius, but of fever’.9
The sickness that Heine and Goethe described had its source in the Ro-
mantic’s perceived relativism, self-indulgence and creative caprice. This charac-
terisation may be largely traced back to Hegel’s vociferous attack on the sub-
jectivity of Romantic irony in the Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik.10 Hegel wrote
of how Romantics claimed to have ‘reached the standpoint of divine genius’.11
In his lectures he argued that the Romantics, ‘proceeding from Fichtean philo-
sophy’,12 maintained ‘the absoluteness of the abstract ego’,13 which ‘sets up
and dissolves everything out of its own caprice’.14 All this left the Romantic,
according to Hegel, longing for objectivity, unable to ‘tear himself free from this
unsatisfied abstract inwardness’.15 For Hegel, the result was quiescence, impot-
ence and the ‘yearning of a morbid beautiful soul’.16 In the end this made the
Romantics, particularly Friedrich Schlegel, ‘bad, useless people who cannot stick
to their fixed and important aim but abandon it again and let it be destroyed
in themselves.’17 When Hegel wrote of how ‘irony was invented by Friedrich
von Schlegel’,18 he was accusing him of the very Fichtean egoism which recent
scholarship (as outlined below) has shown Early German Romanticism to be
opposed to.
Under Hegel’s influence, Kierkegaard adopted a similar concern, going so
far as to say there was no difference between ‘irony’ and the ‘romantic’.19 The
Romantic ironist, explains Kierkegaard, enjoyed ‘divine freedom that knows no
bonds, no chains, but plays with abandon and unrestraint, [and] gambols like
a leviathan in the sea’.20 According to Kierkegaard, this ‘power to bind and
9 Ibid. 191.
10 Cf. Otto Pöggeler, Hegels Kritik der Romantik. München: Wilhelm Fink, 1999.
11 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. by T.M. Knox, 2 vols.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, I, 65.
12 Ibid. I, 67.
13 Ibid. I, 64.
14 Ibid. I, 65.
15 Ibid. I, 66 f.
16 Ibid. I, 67.
17 Ibid. I, 67.
18 Ibid. I, 66.
19 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony: With Continual Reference to Socrates, ed. and trans.
by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, 279.
20 Ibid., 275.
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unbind’,21 defeated historical actuality by suspending it.22 Such an embrace of
relativism appreciated every standpoint, valuing even the abhorrent, leaving
the ironic subjectivity of Early German Romanticism without an absolute, and
rendering it ultimately empty and nihilistic.23
Hegel’s characterisation of the movement easily led to the perception of
Early German Romanticism as naïve, dilettantish and destructive. Heine wrote
of how Tieck ‘drank the mediaeval elixir of youth too deftly’ and became a
child,24 whilst Kierkegaard, citing Heine, expanded this characterisation to the
movement in general.25 Some of these reflections may be more fairly applied
to later forms of Romanticism. as it began exploring the unconscious, and
unravelling Enligthenment assumptions of human rationality and the nature of
progress.26 These explorations of the complex, and sometimes disturbing aspects
of humanity, were expressed in the works of Heinrich von Kleist, Adelbert von
Chamisso, Marquis de Sade and Joseph de Maistre. However, when used to
characterise the Frühromantik, the accusation of subjective egoism is simply
incorrect.
The problematic association of Early German Romanticism with Fichtean
Egoism is repeated and perpetuated in some of the most important early studies
of the Frühromantik by influential figures such as Rudolf Haym, Nicolai Hart-
mann and Hermann August Korff.27 It further recurs in the work of influential
English critics such as Geoffrey Hartman, who emphasised the movement’s con-
cern with naïvety, and Northrop Frye, who wrote of Romanticism’s transference
of superior reality from external reality to the depths of consciousness.28 How-
ever, we must not be too severe in our criticism of this early work. These early
21 Ibid., 275.
22 Ibid., 279.
23 K. Brian Sönderquist, “On Ironic Communication, Subjectivity and Selfhood.” In Kierkegaard
and His German Contemporaries: Literature and Aesthetics, ed. Jon Stewart. Aldershot: Ashgate,
2008, 185–234.
24 Heine, On the History of Religion, 148.
25 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 304.
26 A genealogy of the development of Romantic literaturemay be found inMargarete Kohlenbach,
“Transformations of German Romanticism 1830–2000.” In The Cambridge Companion to German
Romanticism, ed. Nicholas Saul. Cambridge et al.: University Press, 2006, 257–280. Cf. Jacques
Barzun, Classic, Romantic and Modern. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.
27 Rudolf Haym, Die Romantische Schule: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes.
Berlin: R. Gaertner, 1870; Nicolai Hartmann, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. Berlin: de
Gruyter, 1929; Hermann August Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, Teil 3: Frühromantik. Leipzig: Hirzel,
1940. Onemajor exception to this was Oskar Walzel’s Deutsche Romantik. Leipzig: Teubner, 1908,
which stressed the Platonic realism present in Romantic thought.
28 Geoffrey H. Hartman, “Romanticism and Anti-Self-Consciousness.” In id., Beyond Formalism:
Literary Essays, 1958–1970. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970, 298–310; Northrop Frye,
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commentators did not have the benefit of the critical editions of the major Ro-
mantics which we possess today.29 These have made some of the most important
philosophical writing of Early German Romanticism widely available for the first
time. Indeed, the literature-focused approach of much of the twentieth century
should not be dismissed, as many of these classical treatments still constitute
valuable resources.30
There are, however, aspects of twentieth century literary scholarship on
Romanticism that may be more easily discounted. In particular, those readings
which attempt to negatively portray the movement’s concern with preserving
and developing national literatures, its emphasis on artistic genius, and the
conversion of a number of its members to Catholicism. These developments
led some critics to label the movement to be reactionary, anti-democratic, and
even led them to accuse it of giving rise to the irrational völkish nationalism that
culminated in National Socialism.
These claims and associations influenced generations of scholars. In the
first part of the twentieth century we can observe literary critics such as Pierre
Lasserre and Irving Babbitt respectively referring to the destructive Romantic
search for a primitive unity without reality, and its supposed irrational and sick
nature.31 Both appealed to a classical tradition against Romanticism, and the
influence of this call may be seen in the work of T. S. Elliot, Babbitt’s most
famous student.32 The work of these scholars served to enforce the negative
“The Drunken Boat: The Revolutionary Element in Romanticism.” In Romanticism Reconsidered:
Selected Papers from the English Institute, ed. Northrop Frye. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1963, 1–12.
29 E. g. Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), Schriften. Die Werke Friedrich von Hardenbergs
(Historische-kritische Ausgabe), 6 vols., ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Gerhard Schulz,
Hans-Joachim Mähl. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960–2006; Friedrich Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke
(Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe), 6 vols., ed. Friedrich Beißner, Adolf Beck. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,
1946–1985; Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, 35 vols., ed. Ernst Behler
and others. Munich: Schöningh, 1958–2002.
30 E. g. Haym, Die Romantische Schule; Ricarda Huch, Blütezeit der Romantik. Leipzig: Haes-
sel, 1899; ead., Ausbreitung und Verfall der Romantik. Leipzig: Haessel, 1902; Oskar Walzel,
Deutsche Romantik. Eine Skizze. Leipzig: Teubner, 1908; id., German Romanticism, trans. by Alma
Elsie Lussky. New York: Putnam, 1932; Paul Kluckhohn, Das Ideengut der deutschen Romantik.
Bielefeld: Velhagen & Klasing, 1924; Myer H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory
and the Critical Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953; id., Natural Supernaturalism:
Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature. New York et al.: Norton, 1973.
31 Pierre Lasserre, Le romantisme français. Essai sur la révolution dans les sentiments et dans
les idées au XIXe siècle. Paris: Société du Mercvre de France, 1907; Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and
Romanticism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919.
32 E. g. T. S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood. London: Methuen, 1920; id., The Use of Poetry and the Use
of Criticism. London: Faber, 1933.
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readings for a post Second World War environment that was understandably
grasping for a way to make sense of the horrors of that conflict. F. L. Lucas,
described Romantic narcissism, and called Hitler a ‘perverted romantic’, and
an example of ‘the destructiveness of a romanticism gone rotten’.33 Others such
as Peter Viereck, Paul Roubiczek, Isaiah Berlin and György Lukács, levelled
similar accusations.34 René Girard further developed the Hegelian misdiagnoses
of egotistical subjectivity with his notion of the ‘romantic lie’, which he argues
over-emphasises autonomy, obscuring the mediated nature of human desire.35
It is true that many Romantics did see their work as part of a project to
establish a national literature, and as part of an attempt to recover aspects of me-
dieval religiosity. However, they did this whilst also championing a broad canon
of vernacular national literatures, and equally without appealing to ecclesial
authority. Heine’s argument that the Romantic ‘no longer wants to be a citizen of
the world or a European’,36 cannot hold against the near universal Frühromantik
veneration towards pan-European figures such as William Shakespeare, Dante
Alighieri, the Italian Renaissance or classical literature. Nor can it apply when
we consider the interest the Romantics expressed in Oriental religions. This
is also the case with Hegel’s accusation of Romantic elitism. He claimed that
the movement promoted an egotistical standpoint that valued the power of the
individual artist’s own caprice over the dignity of humankind.37 Yet many of the
philosophical arguments of the Romantics sought to defend the dignity of the
individual, particularly against reductionist rational, utilitarian, or materialist
arguments. Despite this, influential claims by those such as Nietzsche, who de-
clared in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft that Schopenhauer and Wagner, respectively
33 Frank Laurence Lucas, The Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1936.
34 Cf. Peter Viereck, Metapolitics. From the Romantics to Hitler. New York: Knopf, 1941; Paul
Roubiczek, The Misinterpretation of Man. Studies in European Thought in the Nineteenth Century.
London: Routledge, 1949, 59–81; Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, ed. Henry Hardy.
London: Pimlico, 2000; György Lukács, The Destruction of Reason. The Way of Irrationalism from
Schelling to Hitler, trans. by Peter Palmer. London: Merlin Press, 1980. For an opposing view cf.
Manfred Frank, “Wie reaktionär war eigentlich die Frühromantik? (Elemente zur Aufstörung der
Meinungsbildung).” In Athenäum. Jahrbuch für Romantik. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997, 141–
166; Ralf Klausnitzer, Blaue Blume unterm Hakenkreuz. Die Rezeption der deutschen literarischen
Romantik im Dritten Reich. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1999.
35 René Gerard, Mensonge romantique et verité romanesque. Paris: Grasset, 1961; id., Deceit,
Desire and the Novel. Self and Other in Literary Structure. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1966.
36 Heine, On the History of Religion, 150.
37 Hegel, Aesthetics, I, 66 f.
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associated with pessimism and anti-Semitism, were the ‘most celebrated and
decided Romantics’, further damaged the movement’s reputation.38
During this period, however, Romanticism was not without its defenders.
Benedetto Croce put forth a more nuanced consideration of the movement,
seeing both classical and romantic as essential elements of the poetic synthesis
of the ideal and real.39 Similarly, Jacques Barzun attacked the contemptuous
clichés that had been directed against the movement, pointing out Romanticism’s
expanded understanding of reason, and its founding importance for modern
art.40 The reception of Romanticism changed further with its dissociation from
conservatism and proto-fascism when, beginning in the 1960s, members of the
Frankfurt School took up its thought. The progressive and utopian potentialities
of the movement are recovered in the work of Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer
and Theodor Adorno. Above all, it was Walter Benjamin, considered in greater
detail below, who played a central role in this recovery.
The legacy of this history of misreading allowed for the academic compart-
mentalisation of Romanticism. The portrayal of the movement as advocating
pure subjectivity, expressed in ironic caprice and poetic agony, had the two-fold
effect of denying Romanticism its philosophical legitimacy, and portraying it as
a literary expression of the age’s anxieties. Accordingly, language and literature
departments focused primarily on the supposed subjective pangs and chimer-
ical fantasies of the movement’s poetical works, while the philosophy of the
period was often considered under the rubric of German Idealism, defined by its
struggle against subjectivism. Furthermore, the taxonomies often applied to the
literary landscape of the period, with titles such as Gefühlphilosophie, Sturm und
Drang and Klassik, and between geographical divisions, such as Berlin, Jena and
Weimar, whilst at times helpful, have often made the divisions between these
overlapping movements appear too neat. Added to this is one of the primary
goals of the Frühromantik, which was to seek a unity among the increasingly di-
vergent disciplines. Schlegel famously wrote: ‘All art should become science and
all science art; poetry and philosophy should be united’.41 Within their circle,
the early Romantics sought to practice Sympoesie, Symkritik and Symphilosophie,
38 Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli Mazzino
Montinari, 15 vols. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag and Walter de Gruyter, 1988, III, 116.
39 Benedetto Croce, Storia d’Europa nel secolo decimonono. Bari: Laterza, 1932; id., History of
Europe in the Nineteenth Century, trans. by H. Furst. London: Allen & Unwin, 1934.
40 Jacques Barzun, “To the Rescue of Romanticism.” The American Scholar 9 (1940), 147–158;
id., Classic, Romantic and Modern. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.
41 Schlegel, Ausgabe, II, 161, no. 115.
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in what Novalis called a ‘Geisterfamilie’ that ignored the boundaries of both
discipline and authorship.42
Yet if Romanticism suffered from the criticism of literary studies, it was
largely dismissed outright by philosophical scholarship. For the most part, the
movement was philosophically ignored, and considered as a literary append-
age of German Romanticism. While of the one side this may be traced to its
characterisation as a subjective movement, it is also the consequence of the
shape of much philosophical discourse through the twentieth century. In part,
the failure to appreciate the philosophical project of Romanticism can be traced
to movements in twentieth century philosophy, which, in addition to adopting
the nineteenth century caricature of Romanticism already considered, aimed to
model the philosophical on the mathematical and natural sciences in distinction
from the literary. Logical Positivism, which in many ways was the forerunner of
the Analytic tradition, aimed to arrive at an objective set of verifiable proposi-
tions of an independent reality. Such a philosophical project could offer little
sympathy to the Romantic, whose fundamental metaphysical concern with the
Absolute led its members to develop a position which stressed the contingency
of explanation, and the poetical understanding of philosophy. On the other
hand both Continental and pragmatic schools have tended to see philosophy as
a kind of literary genera, which is less an attempt to understand reality, than
it is an expression of the subjective self. In such readings there is no reality
independent of the text. Conversely, at the centre of Romantic discourse, is
absolute Being, the fundamental reality which all narratives, philosophical or
otherwise, participate in disclosing. Consequently, one tradition has dismissed
the Romantic project outright, while the other has subsumed it into its own
narrative, mistaking the Romantic use of the fragment and its stress on the in-
completion of systems as a kind of proto-postmodernity. The analytic approach
resists the Romantic claim that all discourse is ultimately poetic in its repres-
entation of rational truth. The Continental tradition resists the realist claims of
the Romantics, seeing behind their imaginative methodology not the Absolute,
but the subjective self. Despite this, as we shall see, recent scholarship on Early
German Romanticism has seen the movement’s thought as a way to solve the
false dichotomy between analytic reductionism and Continental relativism.
42 Schlegel, Ausgabe, XXIV, 22; Novalis, Schriften, I, 686.
Religion and the Problem of Subjectivity 45
3 Recent Scholarship on Early German Romanticism
What Early German Romanticism has required is an approach that overcomes
both the problematic readings of the movement’s detractors and the divisions
that developed through various academic approaches. In part, this has been
made possible by the increased ability to return to sources with the publication
of the critical editions of the works of major Romantic thinkers, such as Schlegel
and Novalis. In the last two decades scholarship on Early German Romanticism
has seen a number of important developments. This work has overcome the
problematic readings of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However,
even while these considerations have worked to overcome the characterisation
of subjectivity, they have nonetheless been structured by this accusation.
The recent reconsideration of the movement can be divided into three broad
categories. First, there is the re-reading of the movement within literary studies
itself, where the post-structuralist reading of Romantic aesthetics has considered
the movement to be a reflection of the fragmentation of the subject both in
language and history. Second, is the reconstruction of Frühromantik through its
context within the history of philosophy, where the issue at stake is to demon-
strate the Romantic project’s aim of overcoming the problem of subjectivity
arising within post-Kantian philosophy. Finally, there is constructive philosophy,
which has attempted to employ Romantic philosophy to counter contemporary
physicalist and deconstructive threats to the self. Each of these considerations
shares a subject-focused approach to the period. Indeed, two of the major figures
in the re-assessment of Early German Romanticism have said precisely this. Man-
fred Frank considers the problem of subjectivity to be ‘the basic interest that has
gripped modern philosophy from Descartes to Husserl (and Sartre)’.43 Similarly,
Dieter Henrich writes: ‘If any basic concept has played the leading role in the
history of Western Philosophy, it is that of self-consciousness’.44 While in many
ways true, it is precisely the persistent concern with subjectivity that has been
largely responsible for obscuring the Frühromantik concern with philosophical
realism.
43 Manfred Frank, “Is subjectivity a Non-Thing, and Absurdity [Unding]? On Some Difficulties in
Naturalistic Reductions of Self-Consciousness.” In The Project of TheModern Subject: Conceptions
of the Self in Classical German Philosophy, ed. Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma. Albany: SUNY
Press, 1995, 177–197, here 177. Frank edited a collection of original materials on the topic in
Selbstbewußtseinstheorien von Fichte bis Sartre. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991.
44 See also Dieter Henrich, “Selbstbewußtsein, kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie.” In Hermen-
eutik und Dialektik, ed. R. Bubner, K. Cramer, R. Wiehl. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck),
1970, 257–284; english trans. “Self-Consciousness, A Critical Introduction to a Theory.” Man
and World 4 (1971), 3–28, here 3.
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3.1 Literary Theory
Whilst Early German Romanticism has always been the concern of literary theory,
recent scholarship has largely focused upon the movement’s critique of the
system and its use of the fragment, casting these concerns as prefiguring the
postmodern linguistic and historical fragmentation of the subject. Under this
reading, the literary form itself is considered to be the Absolute, a problematic
conclusion that does not reflect the ontological primacy of Being in Romantic
philosophy, in effect mistaking the medium for the subject.
Before examining this reading, however, it is incumbent upon us to take note
of two important exceptions to this problematic treatment. One may be found in
the work of Benjamin, in his doctoral dissertation Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der
deutschen Romantik (1920), where he makes an important break from the Hegel-
ian interpretation of Romanticism. Benjamin takes note of the Romantic position,
held in opposition to Fichte, that the intuition of the ‘I’ is impossible without
the world.45 In early Romanticism, Benjamin maintains that the centre of reflec-
tion is not found in the ‘I’, but in art.46 Benjamin characterised the interplay
between the object of art criticism and critical activity as one where ‘perfecting,
positive criticism’ comes to participate in the quasi-mystical disclosure of the
Absolute.47 He goes on to characterise this Romantic Absolute as ‘substantial
and filled’, and art criticism as essential to the process of it unfolding.48 Cri-
ticism lifts the artwork out of the particular, connecting it with the absolute
ideal of art, a process reflecting the ‘messianic’ nature of Romanticism.49 This
notion of artistic reflection breaks from the Hegelian reading of Romanticism as
a reflection of Fichtian ego based subjectivity. Unfortunately, as Andrew Bowie
has pointed out, Benjamin’s insightful reading of Romanticism has been either
underestimated or neglected because of a lack of serious theoretical attention
amongst English-language Germanists.50 In addition to Benjamin, the work of
Ernst Behler must not go unmentioned. Behler was concerned with Romantic
45 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 7
vols. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991, I.1, 32, cited in Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical
Theory. The Philosophy of German Literary Theory. London: Routledge, 1997, 210.
46 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, I, 39.
47 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, ed. Howard Eiland, Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1991–1999, I, 154.
48 Benjamin, Selected Writings, I, 129.
49 Benjamin, Selected Writings, I, 116 f., n. 3, 185. As Benjamin’s thought develops, however,
Romantic criticismbecomes for hima ‘lesser factor in the continued life of literaryworks’ (Benjamin,
Selected Writings, I, 258).
50 Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory, 193, n. 2, 205 f.
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literature, but he was also one of the first commentators to challenge the solely
literary reading of the Frühromantik, particularly in relation to Schlegel. In his
own work, by virtue of his editorship of the Friedrich Schlegel Kritische Ausgabe,
Behler cultivates an appreciation of Schlegel that goes beyond the literary. In his
influential German Romantic Literary Theory, he argues for the movements’ inde-
pendence from Weimar Classicism, Transcendental Idealism, and Enlightenment
encyclopaedism.51
Turning now to the recent proto-postmodern reading of Early German Ro-
manticism, it is best to begin with the influential text L’Absolu littéraire: théorie
de la littérature du romantisme allemand (1978), by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
and Jean-Luc Nancy.52 In this work they claim that in the tension between pro-
duction and reflection, Romantic art constitutes a ‘genre beyond all genres [. . .]
containing the theory of this ‘beyond’ within itself’.53 They specifically single out
the fragment as one of the greatest representations of this ‘work in progress’,54
as it manifests the ‘operative status of the subject’.55 Furthermore the fragment
also represents the post-Critical loss of self-presence. Kant’s Critical philosophy,
in preventing the self from having an adequate self-presentation of the self,
instead constitutes the self as a regulatory idea in the unity of apperception.56
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy aim to overcome this representational difficulty
through what The Literary Absolute calls ‘eidaesthetics’, in which an ideal is
presented through art.57 The fragment displays the productive capacity of poesis,
manifesting the synthetic totality behind each particular manifestation.58 As
such, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy maintain that Romantic literature ‘is thus less
concerned with the production of the literary thing than with production, abso-
lutely speaking. Romantic poetry sets out to penetrate the essence of poiesy, in
which the literary thing produces the truth of production in itself, and thus [. . .]
the truth of the production of itself ’.59 Consequently, ‘romantic thought involves
51 Ernst Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993, 2, 3, 5, 11.
52 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Absolu littéraire: théorie de la littérature du
romantisme allemand. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978. Translated as The Literary Absolute: The
Theory of Literature in German Romanticism, trans. by Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester. Albany:
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58 Ibid., xvi.
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not only the absolute of literature, but literature as the absolute. Frühromantik
is the inauguration of the literary absolute’.60
The strength of The Literary Absolute is the focus it provides upon the philo-
sophical nature of the movement’s aesthetics. However, Lacoue-Labarthe and
Nancy present not so much an historical analysis, as a selective appropriation of
certain elements of Romantic thought that suit more contemporary deconstruct-
ive concerns. This is particularly evident with their focus upon the fragment,
which they claim is for Romanticism ‘the most distinctive mark of its originality,
or the sign of its radical modernity’.61 This position, however, does not account
for the myriad other genres the Romantics employed, and furthermore it does
not consider the Romantic aim of synthesising these genres. Lacoue-Labarthe
and Nancy describe Early German Romanticism as characterised by an ‘uncon-
trollable incompletion’ or an ‘incompletable incompletion’,62 yet the Romantics
were not concerned with the innovation of an absolute idiom. Instead, their
aim was to develop an idiom that expressed absolute Being as articulated in the
irreducibility of art.
Despite these problems, The Literary Absolute has established its own po-
sition in the reception of Romanticism. If the work is considered a creative
appropriation of certain aspects of the movement, then there need be no objec-
tion to it. A number of contemporary philosophers and literary theorists have
sought to use it as a model to explore the literary and philosophical possib-
ilities of the fragment.63 However, problems arise when its assumptions are
anachronistically applied to a reading of Romanticism. To emphasise the frag-
ment alone makes the movement appear far more opposed to the Enlightenment
in character than it actually was, while a failure to take account of the central
role of absolute Being makes Romantic concerns with anti-foundationalism, as
well as its systematic scepticism, appear more reflective of the later twentieth
century linguistic turn than they truly are. Such difficulties may be observed,
for example, in Azade Seyhan’s Representation and its Discontents: The Legacy
of German Romanticism (1992). This text argues that the ‘literary absolute’ of
Romanticism is indeed even more ambiguous than that put forward by Lacoue-




63 E. g. Stanley Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures After Emerson and
Wittgenstein. Albuquerque, NM: Living Batch Press, 1989, 8 f.; Jay Bernstein, The Fate of Art.
Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1992,
60 f.; Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990, 173–195.
64 Cf. Alice Kuzniar, Delayed Endings. Nonclosure in Novalis and Hölderlin. Athens: University of
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the very space where the problem of representation as mediation of presence
becomes most visible in its irremediable ambiguity [. . .] After all, the dominant
figural forms [. . .] of Romanticism are characterised by discontinuity, rupture,
and indirect reference.’65 In the end, the line of inquiry established by Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy incorrectly portrays the Romantics as irrational, ‘clearly
positioning themselves against the representational conceit of philosophy’, and
in their literary production, ‘thriv[ing] on moments of discontinuity, rapture,
and reversal’.66
3.2 Reconstructive historical philosophy
The re-assessment of Early German Romanticism within the context of the history
of philosophy has been a far more fruitful enterprise. This work has been domin-
ated by the work of three scholars: Dieter Henrich, Manfred Frank and Fredrick
Beiser. Beyond these three, many others have made significant contributions to
our philosophical understanding of Romanticism.67 Yet as we shall see, for each
of these three thinkers the central concern of Romanticism is construed foremost
as the attempt to overcome the threat of subjectivity arising from Cartesian and
Kantian dualism.
Henrich adopted an approach to the study of Early German Romanticism
that aims to provide a holistic view by moving away from the production of
Georgia Press, 1978; William O’Brien, Novalis. Signs of Revolution. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1995; Martha Heifer, The Retreat of Representation. The Concept of Darstellung in German
Critical Discourse. Albany: SUNY Press, 1996. Alternately, Behler offered a measured compar-
ative examination of Romanticism and postmodernism in Irony and the Discourse of Modernity.
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990; id., German Romantic Literary Theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993, 299–305.
65 Azade Seyhan, Representation and its Discontents: The Legacy of German Romanticism.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, 8 f.
66 Ibid., 3.
67 Cf. Jürgen Stolzenberg, Fichtes Begriff der intellektuellen Anschauung. Die Entwicklung in
den Wissenschaftslehren von 1793/94 bis 1801/02. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986; Theodore
Ziolkowski, DasWunderjahr in Jena. Geist und Gesellschaft 1794/95. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotca, 1998;
id.,German Romanticism and its Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; id., Clio,
the Romantic Muse. Historicizing the Faculties in Germany. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2004; Violetta Waibel, Hölderlin und Fichte. 1794–1800. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000; Bärbel
Frischmann, Vom transzendentalen zum frühromantischen Idealismus. J. G. Fichte und Fr. Schlegel.
Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005; id., “Der philosophische Beitrag der deutschen Frühromantik und
Hölderlins.” In Handbuch Deutscher Idealismus, ed. Hans Jörg Sandkühler. Stuttgart: Metzler,
2005, 326–354.
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monographs on individual thinkers, set texts and main protagonists. Instead,
his intention has been to reconstruct the Denkraum of a particular period. To do
so means to understand its problems, the way they unfolded and were answered,
and what potentialities were (and were not) developed within its context. This
is the source of his notion of the Konstellation, which takes together a num-
ber of thinkers, both major and minor. These figures interact over a period of
time on a set of issues, influencing the development of one another. Therefore,
Konstellationsforschung reconstructs both the theoretical and personal relations
between thinkers in order to grasp the reason and motivations behind their
work. The level of apprehension achieved by these methods is able to reveal
the potentialities a text presented in its specific historical setting, even beyond
those known to the author.68
In 1985 Henrich applied this methodology to research into the Jena circle,
or constellation, of Romantic thinkers examining the period between 1789 and
1795.69 Around this and other constellations, Henrich’s approach has described
the fecund ground from which the movement sprang, and illustrated its complex
development. This work has brought to light important but hitherto obscure
figures such as Issac von Sinclair and Jacob Zwilling, and provided a detailed
account of the philosophical growth of the young Hölderlin, which has become
a standard reference work.70 Throughout his work, Henrich’s starting point has
continued to be Kant. His own constructive philosophy has developed with
his historical research, evolving out of neglected alternatives in the develop-
ment of Critical philosophy.71 We see this in the attention he has brought to
Immanuel Carl Diez, a Repetent (or fellow) at the Stift in Tübingen, who along
with Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer and Johann Benjamin Erhard, developed
Critical philosophy along more measured lines than the radical and better known
innovations proposed by Reinhold and Fichte.72 These examinations have helped
to initiate a reassessment of post-Kantian philosophy, revealing a landscape that
68 Dieter Freundlieb, Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy. The Return to Subjectivity.
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, 16–18.
69 Dieter Henrich, Konstellationen. Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der idealistischen
Philosophie (1789–1795). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991.
70 Dieter Henrich, Der Grund im Bewußtsein. Untersuchungen zu Hölderlins Denken (1794–
1795). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992.
71 Dieter Henrich, Denken und Selbstsein. Vorlesungen über Subjektivität. Frankfurt a.M.:
Suhrkamp, 2007.
72 Immanuel Carl Diez, Briefwechsel und Kantische Schriften. Wissensbegründung in der
Glaubenskrise Tübingen-Jena (1790–1792), ed. Dieter Henrich. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997; id.,
Grundlegung aus dem Ich. Untersuchungen zur Vorgeschichte des Idealismus: Tübingen-Jena
(1790–1794), 2 vols. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004.
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is far more complex than one populated simply by idealist system-builders and
literary Romantics.73
Henrich’s Kant-centred approach, however, has meant that his project is
driven by a concern with epistemological issues arising out of the reception
of Critical philosophy. In turn, his has caused him to make some problematic
claims. For example, he maintains that the Romantic theory of art and poetry
originated in Fichte’s Wiessenshaftslehre. Such statements, while not incorrect,
are errors by the omission of other fundamentally important motivations, partic-
ularly those concerning religion, and the role of Platonic realism.74
Manfred Frank carries out a similar reconstructive historical examination of
the period. Like Henrich, Frank’s work has played an essential role in distinguish-
ing the thought of Early German Romanticism from idealism, demonstrating how
it developed its own unique response to the challenges of Kant’s philosophy.
According to Frank, the Romantics were not idealists at all, but advocated a
position of philosophical realism.75 He explains how the idealists, and Hegel in
particular, held that consciousness was a self-sufficient phenomenon, capable of
comprehending its existence by its own means. Alternately, the Romantics held
that consciousness of Being was grounded in the transcendent.76 The ontological
priority of Being is, according to Frank, the ‘first complete expression’ of early
German Romanticism.77 Through this position the foundation of consciousness
becomes non-transparent; that is, it cannot be an object of reflection as we are
unable to access it.
The consequence of holding this position for Romanticism is that it comes to
develop a strong scepticism toward philosophical foundationalism and system-
aticity. We can observe this in the Romantic reaction toward the philosophies
of Reinhold and Fichte, by Hölderlin, Novalis and Schlegel. More importantly,
this allows us to account for the movement’s embrace of the aesthetic, a form of
expression which articulates Being through feeling and intuition, expressed in
73 This effect has been limited in English as little is translated, excepting The Course of Remem-
brance and Other Essays on Hölderlin, ed. Eckart Förster. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1997. Alternatively, two of Henrich’s texts on Kant have been translated: Aesthetic Judgment
and the Moral image of the World: Studies in Kant. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991;
The Unity of Reason. Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Richard Velkley. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994.
74 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel. Lectures on German Idealism, ed. David S. Pacini.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, 3.
75 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. by Eliza-
beth Millán-Zaibert. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004, 28.
76 Ibid., 863.
77 Ibid., 729.
52 Aexander J. B. Hampton
irony, fragment and poetry. This means that, for the Romantics, philosophy as
a discursive reflective process has limited purchase on fundamental questions,
and the aesthetic has increased legitimacy as a mode for the consideration of
the Absolute. Whilst Frank has argued for the primacy of Being in Romantic
thought, he does not acknowledge the religious dimension of this position. In-
stead, he maintains that this absolute Being was akin to a sense of existence,
something with religious potential, but one that does not extend beyond the
limits of reason.
Friedrick Beiser, is the third of the three major historical scholars. His
work has played an important role in explaining the thought of Early German
Romanticism to the Anglophone world, by offering a detailed treatment of the
period, and by taking on thorny issues such as the authority of reason, and
the problem of subjectivity.78 In the process of doing so, his work has provided
us with some of the first substantive philosophical treatments in English of
Hölderlin, Novalis and Schlegel.79 Like his two predecessors, Beiser is concerned
with philosophical issues, particularly as defined by Kant, having to do with the
authority of reason and the problem of subjectivity.
Like Frank, Beiser sees the Frühromantik as defined by the notion of the on-
tological priority of the Absolute and the consequent anti-foundationalism which
arises from this position, both of which lead to the development of fragmentary,
non-systematic and aesthetic approaches that differ from the idealists. However,
unlike Frank, Beiser defines the Romantics, along with Hegel and Schelling, as
‘absolute idealists’, whereas Frank argues that epistemological and ontological
realism is the defining factor of Romanticism exclusively.80 This apparent dif-
ference can be explained through Beiser’s assessment of Romantic Spinozism,
as modified by Herder, and the role of Platonic influences in the thought of the
Romantics. According to Beiser, these influences lead the absolute idealists to
develop a vitalist view wherein the Absolute is ‘nothing less than the whole
of nature’.81 Under this reasoning, it follows that both subject and object have
their source in an Absolute realist ground. This is the key to Beiser’s central
thesis that absolute idealism is defined by a struggle against the subjectivism
that follows from critical idealism. According to Beiser, Frank and Henrich focus
78 Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason. German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987; id., The Romantic Imperative. The Concept of Early German
Romanticism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003; id., German Idealism. The Struggle
Against Subjectivism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
79 Beiser, German Idealism, 349–464.
80 Cf. Frederick Beiser, “Romanticism and Idealism.” In The Relevance of Romanticism, ed. Dalia
Nassar. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 30–45.
81 Beiser, German Idealism, 356.
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too narrowly, and fail to give adequate attention to Platonism, leading them to
overemphasise Romantic scepticism.82 This has the effect, explains Beiser, of
making Romanticism appear more obscurantist and therefore open to charges
of anti-rationalism.83
The position which Beiser advances has both advantages and disadvantages.
On the negative side, by treating Early German Romanticism and idealism to-
gether it can make the former seem merely as a stage on the way to culmination
in the thought of Schelling.84 The strong emphasis on the difference between
Romantics and idealists in the work of Frank, avoids such difficulties, but in
doing so fails to take account of the aspects of objective idealism which the
movement shares with Schelling and Hegel.85 Alternately, when Beiser directs
our attention to the Platonic sources of Romantic realism this allows him to ad-
dress some fundamental problems in the history of the movement’s reception. In
particular, he is able to debunk various readings of the Romantics as irrational
or somehow proto-postmodern.86 Here Beiser has in mind Paul de Man, Isaiah
Berlin, Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Ernst Behler, and Manfred
Frank himself.87
3.3 Constructive subjective philosophy
Finally, the recent re-assessment of Early German Romanticism has seen a con-
structive philosophical engagement with the movement. Like the historical
reconstruction, the so-called Heidelberg School of Henrich and Frank defines
the assessment of Romanticism, and whilst their positions differ in some sig-
nificant ways, for the purposes of this examination it is possible to treat them
together.88 The work of Andrew Bowie has equally played an important role,
developing this reconsideration further, and exposing the work of the Heidelberg
82 Ibid., 354 f., 364 f.; Beiser, Romantic Imperative, 56–72. Cf. Rüdiger Bubner, The Innovations
of Idealism, trans. by Nicholas Walker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 3–46.
83 Beiser, Romantic Imperative, 63.
84 E. g. When considering Schelling in comparison to the Romantics, Beiser writes: ‘What
was merely fragmentary, inchoate and suggestive in Hölderlin, Novalis and Schlegel became
systematic, organised and explicit in Schelling’, German Idealism, 467.
85 Cf. Beiser, “Romanticism and Idealism”.
86 Beiser, Romantic Imperative, 1–5.
87 Ibid., ix.
88 ‘Heidelberg School’ is first adopted by Ernst Tugendhat, Selbstbewubtsein und Selbstbestim-
mung. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1979, 10.
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school to an Anglophone audience by both by describing its relation to analytic
philosophy and to literary theory.89
Building upon historical scholarship, this reconstructive work sets out a
subjective ontology that overcomes the dualism of the Cartesian and Kantian
legacies.90 This dualism is consequence of the reflection model of consciousness,
wherein the self achieves self-consciousness by becoming an object to itself.
The problem with this model arises from the fact that the self, as subject, must
already know itself, as object, to recognise itself. Accordingly, a state of affairs
is established which ultimately requires the establishment of a dogmatic pre-
supposition. In the case of Descartes, the ‘I’ is secured through the assurance
of a non-deceptive God. Alternately, in the case of Kant the transcendental ‘I’,
while accompanying representation, is purely logical, and cannot be the object
of knowledge or theory. Both post-Kantian idealism and Romanticism challenge
these conclusions concerning the self, theorising the foundational ‘I’, or finding
its ground in an Absolute beyond the self.
In more recent philosophical deliberations, the problem of subjectivity has
led broadly to the development of two positions. On the one side the physicalist
position maintains that consciousness can and must be accounted for within
the scope of the natural sciences. Such a position has been proposed by W. V. O.
Quine and Daniel Dennett. On the other side, the deconstructive approach of
thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida attacks the foundationalist
89 Cf. Andrew Bowie, “John McDowell’s Mind and World, and Early Romantic Epistemology.”
Revue internationale de philosophie 50 (1996), 515–555; id., Romanticism to Critical Theory.
The Philosophy of German Literary Theory. London: Routledge, 1997; id., “German Philosophy
Today: Between Idealism, Romanticism and Pragmatism.” In Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures,
German Philosophy After Kant, ed. Anthony O’Hear. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999, 357–98; id., “Romantic Aesthetics and the Ends of Contemporary Philosophy.” In Das
neue Licht der Frühromantik. Innovation und Aktualität frühromantischer Philosophie, ed. Bärbel
Frischmann, Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008, 213–224; id., “Nineteenth
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Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Alison Stone. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011,
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Andrew Bowie, trans. by Helen Atkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
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ische Essays. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1982, 125–181; trans. in “Self-Consciousness and
Speculative Thinking.” In Figuring the Self. Subject, Absolute, and Others in Classical German
Philosophy, ed. David E. Klemm, Günter Zöller. Albany: SUNY Press, 1997, 99–133; id., Denken
und Selbstsein. Vorlesungen über Subjektivität. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2007. For an as-
sessment of Henrich’s philosophy, see Freundlieb, Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy.
Manfred Frank, “Is subjectivity a Non-Thing, and Absurdity [Unding]?, 177 f.; id., Selbstbewußtsein
und Selbsterkenntnis. Essays zur analytischen Philosophie der Subjektivität. Stuttgart: Reclam,
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logocentrism of the subject. Opposing both of these, the constructive position of
Henrich, Frank and Bowie maintain that the physicalist strictures of scientific
discourse fail to do justice to the nature of subjectivity, while the post-structural
death of the subject fails to account for the fact that self-consciousness is prior
to language (or if it emerged with language, it is equally a precondition for
language and not explained by language). The end of philosophy is therefore to
offer an understanding of our place in the world. In the work of Early German
Romanticism and idealism, Henrich and Frank see one of the most promising,
if not entirely successful, attempts to set out an ontology that overcomes the
dualist legacy, and the problematic responses of physicalist reductionism and
post-structuralism.
In their work, Henrich, Frank and Bowie, each seek to deploy the funda-
mental Romantic insight, that Being exceeds consciousness. In the development
of Romanticism itself, this position was advocated first by Jacobi, then by Hölder-
lin, Schlegel and Novalis, and was also adopted into the late work of Fichte
and Schelling. Henrich, working from Fichte’s later thought, considers self-
consciousness to be irreducible. As such, its components cannot be separated
into the stages that constitute reflection theory.91 Similarly, Frank has shown
corresponding insights in Jacobi and the earliest stages of Romanticism.92 In
their proposals, the constructive position situates itself between the analytical
and continental traditions. A number of scholars including Peter Dews, John
McDowell and Jürgen Habermas, have subsequently responded positively to this
proposal.93
91 Dieter Henrich, “Fichte’s Original Insight.” Contemporary German Philosophy 1 (1982),
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The constructive efforts of the Heidelberg school are notable for their in-
sights, but also for illustrating to us how contemporary philosophical issues
relating to subjectivity have constituted a major driving force behind the his-
torical reconstruction of Early German Romanticism as produced by the same
scholars. Their efforts to bring Romantic and idealist thought to bear on con-
temporary philosophical problems is by no means something to be objected to.
In fact, it can also serve as a model, for when the look at Romanticism from the
perspective of problems of religion, such as understanding the complexity of
the secularisation process, or addressing issues of pluralism, the influence and
insights of Romanticism have an important role to play.
4 From subjective egoism to the Absolute and Romantic
religion
For much of its history, the reception of Early German Romanticism has suffered
from the misconceptions of its early detractors. Recent scholarship, produced
over the past twenty-five years, has opened up new possibilities for its re-
consideration, definitively demonstrating how the Romantics were philosophical
thinkers in their own right, actively developing an alternative to the subjectivism
which they had been accused of promoting. However, this re-evaluation of the
Romantics has focused primarily upon problems of epistemology as they arose
from the challenge of subjectivity. In part, this was necessary, as it was incum-
bent upon this scholarship to address almost two hundred years of misinterpret-
ation. What remains to be explored is the religious dimension of Romanticism,
which comes into relief as the problem of subjectivity recedes. This allows us
to see the movement’s concern with the Absolute as far more than a regulative
idea in the service of epistemological inquiry; rather, as a concept it had a real
ontological status, bound up with a set of metaphysical concerns that relate
directly to religion. While it is beyond the scope of this examination to offer
an extended explication of Romantic religion, it is possible to conclude with a
summary of the elements such a consideration would have to take into account.
Any account of Romantic religion must consider both the realist and idealist
elements of the movement’s thought. Though it is possible to characterise the
concern of the Frühromantiker in many ways, the Absolute was the chief sub-
ject of their speculative endeavour and the object of their poetic striving. Their
consideration of the Absolute arises from the locus classicus within the tradition
of philosophical theology, that considers the problem of the relation between
the finite and the infinite, or the transcendent and the immanent, and not just
as an abstract regulative concept within the post-Kantian debate. Under the
Religion and the Problem of Subjectivity 57
influence of Platonism the Absolute participates in, and gives existence to, all
finite reality, just as the Good does in Platonic thought. However, the Romantics
were also aware of, and accepted, the idealist contention that the subject plays a
fundamental role in the structuring of all experience. From this they developed
their non-foundationalist commitments, wherein Being could only ever be infin-
itely approximated, and therefore never constitute a non-inferential foundation.
It is between the two that the role of the aesthetic emerges. Since the Abso-
lute, by nature, transcends any category or concept it requires an idiom that is
neither closed nor complete. The aesthetic idiom, like the ‘probable myth’ of the
Timeaus, aims to express truths that nevertheless cannot be exhausted by any
particular articulation.94
If religion is that which is concerned with supreme Being, infinite nature,
and the determinant feature of existence, then the Romantic endeavour, with
the Absolute at its centre, is certainly religious in nature, if not conventionally
so. In this regard Early German Romanticism has much to say to the academic
study of religion. Romanticism may not conform to conventional categories of
religion, but the categories that define religion itself are what the movement
sought to challenge. The Romantics objected to an understanding of religion
that was restricted to historically determined institutions, practices and symbols.
Rather it sought to re-invent religion for its own radically changed age.
If we truly wish to hear what Early German Romanticism has to say of
religion however, what we really ought to do is turn to what the Romantics
themselves had to say. We may find an example in Novalis late poem, simply
titled Das Gedichte (1799). It consists of eight strophes, with the initial four
offering a description of the present. In the first strophe, nature longs for the
recognition of its sublimity. In the second, what seems a great, empty, dimly lit
church stands abandoned. Then, in the third and fourths strophes a silent text
proclaims a renewed future, and the reader is asked to draw near, and await a
promised prophecy. The final four strophes of the poem read:
Himmlisches Leben im blauen Gewande
Stiller Wunsch in blassem Schein –
Flüchtig gräbt in bunten Sande
Sie den Zug des Namens ein –
Unter hohen festen Bogen
Nur von Lampenlicht erhellt
Liegt, seitdem der Geist entflogen
Nun das Heiligste der Welt.
94 Plato, Timaeus, 29d, 68d, 69b.
58 Aexander J. B. Hampton
Leise kündet beßre Tage
Ein verlornes Blatt uns an
Und wir sehn der alten Sage
Mächtige Augen aufgetan.
Naht euch stumm dem ernsten Tore,
Harrt auf seinen Flügelschlag
Und vernehmt herab vom Chore
Wo weissagend der Marmor lag.95
After the description of a pregnant present, the poem swiftly shifts to the past,
recalling a time, either antique or medieval. Here, Novalis describes the colourful
festival of the flower princess. However, almost as soon as she appears and is
greeted, she disappears. Our poetic vocation, according to the poem, is to recover
our ability to read, in our immanent present, these transcendent signs of the
omnipresent Absolute. This divine Absolute speaks to us through ciphers in the
sand and lost leaves that proclaim better days. It is poetry that frees us once
again to read these leaves. With this new freedom, we may re-enter the empty
churches and light therein their lamps. In them we will once again, through the
power of poetry, approach the marble altar, and hear the choir sing. This vision
of religion renewed is yet to come for Novalis, but its presence, as the Absolute,
is already with us, and a renewed language, the language of poetry, will give it
voice.
95 Novalis, Schriften, I, 409 f. (ll. 1–16).
